


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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

EUROCOMMUNISM: MYTH OR MONOLITH?

INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Lieutenant Colonel James P. Todd Engineer

US Army War College Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013 9 May 1977

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	REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE					
REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER				
TITLE (and Subtitle)		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED				
EUROCOMMUNISM: MYTH OR MONOLITH?		Individual Study Project				
		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER				
. AUTHOR(e)		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(*)				
LTC James P. Todd, CE						
PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS				
US ARMY WAR COLLEGE						
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AUTHOR(S): James P. Todd, LTC, EN

TITLE: Eurocommunism: Myth or Monolith?

FORMAT: Individual Study Project

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DATE: 9 May 1977 PAGES: 65 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

"What is the answer? What is the question?"

Gertrude Stein

A possible milestone in the long history of the international Communist movement occurred over June 29-30, 1976, in the Conference Hall of the thirty-seven story Stadt Berlin Hotel in East Berlin.

A veritable army of newsmen (more than 800) from all continents anxiously awaited the events that were to unfold as the leaders of the Communist Parties of twenty-nine European nations met at the Conference of European Communist and Workers Parties. When the conference had concluded, after two days of speeches, many of which proclaimed the right of each Communist Party to make its own decisions and go its own way independent of Moscow, few were in agreement as to the total significance of all that transpired. However, these bold proclamations of independence by so-called democratic Communist Parties of Western Europe surfaced many challenging questions that have broad implications for international relations both for the East and the West.

What is this phenomenon called Eurocommunism? Is there actually a new kind of communism, an independent political force at work in the countries of Western Europe that will shape a new balance of power and alliance structure in the future? If so, what does this portend for the United States and its NATO alliance, the USSR and its Warsaw Pact, and the Peoples Republic of China?

In the light of the events of 29-30 June, it would not be surprising to see the Soviet Union move cautiously before initiating further international or pan-European Communist Party conferences.

Such august gatherings (always held with the intention of strengthening Soviet leadership over a waning international Communist movement and to illustrate to the Western world the "solidarity" of world communism) have in fact contributed further to Moscow's increasing crisis of authority.

Khrushchev denouncing Stalinism, the first crack in the foundation of international communism appeared: Khrushchev conceded the idea being advanced by influential Communist Parties since Tito's 1948 break with Stalin: that there are "different roads to socialism." Although not intending the concession to proceed further, it grew into the concept of "different kinds of socialism" so that by 1960, the Chinese and Albanian delegations felt free to flatly denounce the Soviet leadership in the world movement. At that historic conference, Khrushchev proposed the abandonment of any wording implying Soviet hegemony over international communism. In 1961, at the 22nd Congress of the CPSU, the unanimity of the Communist movement was shattered even more with renewed attacks by the Chinese on Stalin and an open airing of the Sino-Soviet differences.

The historic Sino-Soviet split has had a profound impact upon

East-West bipolar relationships. Since that time, the Russian

leadership (after deposing Khrushchev), has attempted to re-establish

its international party leadership, has been adamant in its denunciation

of the PRC, and has pressured other Communist Parties to do likewise. In 1969, after nine years of debate and negotiations, what may prove to be the last world conference of Communist Parties was convened in Moscow. Instead of re-establishing Soviet leadership, the conference declared that there was no leading center of the world Communist movement. Kevin Devlin of Radio Free Europe summarized the efforts of the Soviet Union during these nine years with the following: "Nikita Khrushchev set out to convene the Council of Trent and Leonid Brezhnev ended up with Vatican II."

In spite of such a failure, perhaps a point of no return, the Soviet leaders continued the efforts to organize another world conference, this time under the sponsorship of the loyalist parties of satellite countries such as Hungary and Bulgaria. Right from the start, difficulties arose among independent parties such as those from Romania and Yugoslavia. They presented obstructions such as contrary demands that (1) the conference could not issue any statement unless it was agreed to be every party present and (2) the final statement would not be binding on the participants.

After 1974, the emphasis shifted to a pan-European conference. The Russians had much to gain from such a format. It would bring together such divergent forces as the East European satellites, the East European dissidents (Romania and Yugoslavia), and those parties of Western Europe. This program was especially attractive since the Western parties had held regional meetings since 1959 and there was an ever-increasing danger of this Western bloc becoming institutionalized.* Such a pan-

^{*}Conferences held in Rome in 1959, Brussels in 1965, Vienna in 1966 and again in Brussels in 1974.

European conference might serve to soften the growing independent spirit of these democratic-minded Communists.

The conference took two years to materialize due to the strong attempts of the Soviets to dominate its formulation of objectives.

As usual, the Russians wanted the final statement to include a strong condemnation of China, continued indorsement of the basic tenets of Leninism and support from the Western parties for their two major upcoming negotiations with Western powers: the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the meetings on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions.

Such conference issues were too much for some Western parties, who feared erosion of significant electoral gains if the conference final statement appeared to be so oriented towards supporting Moscow's parochial interests. The Italian Party was jealous of its parliamentary gains and the Spanish Party (in exile) was declining any strong ties with the Russians in order to strengthen its bid for legitimacy in the forthcoming post-Franco era. The initial planning meeting for the conference (Warsaw, 1974), saw the Soviet agenda so undermined that the basic purposes of the conference were eliminated. Anathemas against China were taken out; no discussion of ideology would take place; no decisions would involve obligations to others; and, the conference would include other socialist parties.

The Soviet ambitions of uniting European Communist Parties by reinforcing their Leninist heritage were further thwarted when the Yugoslavian Party convened a conference in Belgrade in April, 1975,

which included not only the Communist Parties of Europe but, contrary to Soviet wishes--also twenty-six socialist and social-democratic parties.

After numerous preparatory meetings with alternating concessions and demands by Moscow, the East Berlin conference became a reality in June 1976. The catalytic events of the ill-fated conference that was destined to shake the already cracked foundations of international communism were not without premonitory tremors prior to the meeting.

The first involved a puzzling incident reported in Pravda concerning the Portuguese revolution. Both the Spanish and Italian parties had been involved in violent recriminations against the revolutionary tactics of Alvaro Cunhal because of the detrimental effect his actions were having on their "image." By the end of 1974, this opposition had turned to support for Mario Soares and his socialist party in Portugal. In August of 1975, Gian Carlo Pajetta, a senior official of the Italian Communist Party, was in Moscow to discuss relationships with the Portuguese Communists. Upon his arrival in Moscow, Pajetta was greeted with a feature article in Pravda written by a hard-line Leninist journalist, Konstantin Zarodov. In the article, Zarodov condemned "opportunist concepts," "present day conciliators," and further derided the notion that Communists should wait until they win a popular majority at the polls to seize power (in other words, a revolutionary majority is not always arithmetical). He further expressed in the article horror at the willingness of some Communists to dissolve the "proletarian purity" of their parties with alliances resulting in "ideological amorphism." This was aimed not only at the

Italians and Spanish, but also at the French Communists who had been allied with the socialists in their country since 1972.

Zarodov's article stirred considerable controversy in Western European parties since such hard-line tactics would obviously result in electoral losses in their countries. In addition, at the same time, two hard-line party leaders, Boris Ponomarev and Mikhail Suslov were being quoted as supporting the idea of the popular front (forming alliances) as being appropriate today. How were the Western parties to interpret Moscow's position?

When Brezhnev himself supported the Zarodov message, tensions grew even stronger. Leopold Labedz, editor of <u>Survey</u> magazine, suggested that Zarodov intended to warn the Western Europeans to slow down in their proclamations of autonomy and criticisms of Portugal, Czechoslovakia and the forthcoming European Communist Party Conference. However, the western parties were concerned with the threatening nature of the events.

The second event predicting difficulties in East Berlin occurred in Moscow in the following February at the 25th Soviet Party Congress.

The leader of the French Communist Party, Georges Marchais, declined to attend the conference but his representative joined the parties of Yugoslavia, Romania, Sweden, Great Britain, Belgium, Spain and Italy to repudiate the dictatorship of the proletariat, a basic premise of Soviet communism. Enrico Berlinguer, leader of the Italian Communist Party, spoke out supporting individual Communist's parties' rights to hold differing views and experiences, and to declare the pluralistic nature of the Western European Communist political environment.

The impending crisis reached its peak in East Berlin. In a conference that may well prove to be the central event in European communism since World War II, western Communist leaders one by one proclaimed their independence from Moscow and their complete rejection of proletarian internationalism, the cornerstone of Soviet international hegemony. The conference's final document, "For Peace, Security, Cooperation and Social Progress in Europe," included no condemnation of the PRC, no obeisance to Moscow, and no formal recognition of Marxism-Leninism. 5

Santiago Carillo, leader of the Spanish Communist Party, compared the activities of the conference to Martin Luther's rejection of Rome. He said, "For years, Moscow was our Rome; the October Revolution was our Christmas. But today we have grown up." Carillo further declared the party to only have a concern with politics and social struggle, not an individual's private life and ambitions. This is a decided break with the traditional Communist view of total dedication and faith to the cause.

Brezhnev, in his concluding speech at the conference flatly denied Moscow's imposition of its will on others; he defended proletarian internationalism, but stressed that it only meant voluntary cooperation citing that fear of Moscow was merely "strange comprehensions."

Reaction to the conference in the press was mixed. Soviet media glossed over the conference, proclaiming it as a positive step forward towards a more durable peace, more lasting security and broader cooperation.

Strangely missing from the Russian press were discussions

of statements and speeches by the dissident parties. Western press reaction ranged from proclaiming the final collapse of the Soviet hold on international communism to words of caution, fearing the Western Communist parties were merely employing a tactical maneuver to gain power. Henry Kissinger warned that Eurocommunism might well be the "Trojan Horse of Totalitarianism."

What are the questions raised by the results of the conference? Foremost is the nature of Eurocommunism itself. Is it but another of a series of ruptures that have punctuated the history of the Communist movement, such as Lenin's split with the Russian socialists in 1912, splits with the European socialists in the '20's, the expulsion of Tito in 1948, and the Sino-Soviet dispute of the 60's? Or is it indeed a revolutionary revision of traditional Leninist-Marxist doctrine to allow its successful adaptation to the unique social, political and economic conditions of advanced industrial nations where traditions are steeped in parliamentary democracy and civic freedom?

Eurocommunist claims and promises cause concern to political leaders in both the East and the West. The Russians are concerned because the West European parties to one degree or another promise not to upset the European military balance, to allow the United States to retain basing rights, and agree to seek power only through elections and step down if subsequently defeated. Party platforms also include respect for human freedoms to an extent not normally allowed by the repressive Soviet state. Moscow views Eurocommunism as contributing to further disintegration of Soviet world authority and increasing restiveness in Eastern

Europe. Russia's policy dilemma is threefold: crush them and widen the split; encourage them and possibly alienate detente with the governments in power; or take no action and risk further upheaval in Eastern Europe or even a weakening of their own regime in the USSR.

The United States is in a similar dilemma. The United States questions the validity of the promises and claims of the Eurocommunists and greatly fears the impact on the NATO alliance of Communist participation in key positions in allied governments. What priority would a Communist-led government place on multi-lateral security or national defence? What effect would such control have on US basing rights and host nation support of logistical lines of communication? The presence of Communists in Western European leadership positions would certainly limit nuclear planning and the dissemination of defence secrets. Questions also arise concerning the impact of a Communist ascension to power in one or more western governments upon the EEC. There is also reason to question the probability of a Communist government with control of both the police and military permitting a free election, or ever stepping down if defeated. Thus the United States also faces a multi-faceted dilemma of how to approach the challenge of Eurocommunism. If the United States presupposes a Communist ascension and opens up to Communist leaders to preserve a chance for influence when they do indeed take office, prestige and influence with current Western allies (and paradoxically, even relations with the USSR) would inevitably suffer. (It is interesting to note at this juncture that American efforts for detente with the USSR have been a dominant factor in the new

respectability of the West European Communists). A show of antagonism towards the western parties might drive them into a closer dependence on Moscow. Furthermore, opposition to the parties could be interpreted as aligning with Moscow and alienate large segments of the democratic voters in the countries whose votes are keeping the Communists out of power. Unfortunately, the US has little to gain by supporting the incumbent governments which are largely incompetent and do not have solutions to their country's problems. Finally, to remain neutral allows the continued rise of the Communist Parties in Western Europe.

The Eurocommunists themselves are not without vexing problems and dilemmas. Striving to exist in the best of two worlds both domestically and internationally, they are faced with difficult choices. The nature and composition of the parties themselves make identification with the international Communist movement and the USSR vital to internal party cohesion while at the same time, dissent with the USSR is imperative to gaining domestic influence. The Communist parties want the lessening of tensions under detente to assist them in domestic progress, but they are not interested in disturbing either the Atlantic Alliance or the Warsaw Pact. 11 While not interested in becoming additional Soviet satellites, the western European Communists do not want to be under the influence of the United States. 12 The three broad goals all Eurocommunists have in common are the development of their parties, pursuit of political and social alliances, and continued maintenance of a link with their heritage in international communism

and the USSR. 13 The balancing of these three goals is a phenomenal task.

Solutions to these problems and many related issues are not easily found. A better understanding of the dimensions of Eurocommunism may be gained by examining it in subsequent chapters in the light of its history, its place in the ideological evolution of communism, and its domestic and international political environment.

The East Berlin conference was a milestone. World communism will never be the same again just as it has never been the same since the Sino- Soviet ideological split. 14 Only time will tell how much of an impact the nationalistic proclamations of the Eurocommunists will have on political and strategic events throughout the world.

The conference ended on a sober note. Even though the Soviet press hailed the gathering as a "great success for unity," the Europeans did not join in the traditional singing of the "Internationale." 15

CHAPTER I

FOOTNOTES

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- 2. Daniel Seligman, "Communism's Crisis of Authority," Fortune, February 1976, p. 93.
 - 3. Ibid., p. 170.
 - 4. Ibid., p. 172.
- 5. Raymond Carroll, "A Show of Independence," Newsweek, 12 July 1976, p. 33.
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 - 15. Carroll, p. 34.

CHAPTER II

THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

"It is one thing to know history; it is another to understand it."

Paul Claudel

Using the historical perspective to examine the Communist parties of Western Europe as a contemporary political force reveals several important factors.

While a majority of the West European Communist Parties have a similar genesis and early history, there has emerged since the post World War II era a decided polarity between the parties in the northern and southern regions of Europe. For many years, only the Communist parties of France, Italy, and Finland were considered major parties capable of obtaining in excess of twenty percent of the popular vote in an election, but the last decade has seen a decided rise in the strength and influence of the three principal parties in Latin Europe (Italy, France, and Spain) far exceeding all other Western parties.

As recently as 1967, some political observers felt that there was no distinctive West European communism as such, but rather only Communist parties working in roughly comparable circumstances. The same might be said today, because except for the three southern parties cited above, most Communist parties exist only as minor sects cut off from the main currents of national life in Western Europe.

The regional nature of West European communism has grown more apparent throughout the past decade as parties in Scandinavia and West Germany have been weakened by a shift in the political spectrum in their

countries to a more centrist position. This was most dramatically demonstrated in 1976 when Olaf Palme was defeated in Sweden, ending forty-four years of socialist party rule in that country. The socialist parties in Western Europe are also regionally aligned with the parties in the north refraining from entering into alliances or coalitions while the parties in the south use this strategy to help them gain political power. Thus, the influence of West European communism from a historical perspective can best be understood by examining the history of the three Communist parties of Latin Europe. Before doing this, it would be helpful to establish some critical benchmarks in the development of communism throughout Europe to include the Soviet Union.

The victory of Lenin's Bolshevik faction in 1903 can serve as a starting point for the establishment of communism as a political force. At this time, Lenin emerged from an environment in Russia confused by the ambiguities of Marxism.

In reality, Marx had analyzed capitalism too early (a common danger in the social sciences). His predictions of the inevitable decay and collapse of capitalism with the impoverishment of the working classes never materialized. The same Western Europe which had inspired Marx's analysis later invalidated it. The evolution of trade unionism, with opportunities for political action by the workers, shifted the emphasis in Marxism away from revolutionary activism to an emphasis on gaining immediate material advantage. This emphasis was called economism. ²

This revisionist current, led by Eduard Bernstein, denounced the negative and intolerant character of Marxism as too simplistic. As early as 1890, this revised emphasis of Marxism urged the reformation

of society in a democratic direction adapted to the contemporary state of affairs. The basic strategic approach of these revisionists shifted from revolution to evolution.

Most Marxists in Europe around the turn of the century still believed that the revolution would only begin in a highly industrialized country possessing a large working class. Lenin developed an adaptation of Marxism that envisioned an attack on capitalism at its weakest link—a backward country like Russia. Turning Marx upside down as Marx had turned Hegel upside down fifty years earlier, Lenin proceeded to change the backwardness of Russia from an obstacle to an opportunity. 5

Lenin trained a highly disciplined, hard-core, revolutionary elite to seize power in Russia and thus attempt to spark the inevitable world-wide revolution against capitalism. His opponents, the Mensheviks, a mass party embracing many socialist groups, wanted to postpone the revolution in Russia until industrialization had weakened the bourgeois class and power could be assumed legally.

Lenin was a brilliant leader. He supported his overall strategy of revolution with tactical flexibility, always willing to make sharp adjustments in party line to fit circumstances. Adjustments were necessary; the anticipated worldwide revolution did not materialize and the Bolsheviks suddenly found themselves alone with the Russian masses in the early 1920's.

From this early history of Bolshevism (Marxist-Leninism), can be extracted several principles by which to measure contemporary Communist parties. They include: a monolithic and totalitarian party; elitism; centralized leadership; party discipline; absolutism of party line;

intolerance of disagreement or compromise; subordination of ends to means; drive for total power.⁶

The young Communist parties springing up throughout all of Europe at this time faced different problems since they were all outside of the government. In Latin Europe, the rise of fascism forced the Italian Communist Party underground while at the same time, French Communists started a long history of conformity to the Soviet model. All Communist parties were under the discipline of the international Communist organization, the Comintern, which forced them to adjust to sudden shifts in policy dictated by Moscow. In Western Europe, the parties were under constant tension attempting to reconcile two roles: being part of an international movement looking to the Soviet Union for policy guidance and material aid while at the same time, being national parties anxious to respond to the expectations of actual or potential domestic supporters or partners. 7

The 1930's witnessed the first reconciliation of these two conflicting roles with the emergence of the popular fronts. These coalition maneuvers were an abrupt about-face and achieved the greatest success in France during the years 1934-1939. Even the Soviet Union attempted to show a democratic face at this time by passing a democratic constitution (which has never been adhered to) and joining the League of Nations (a former anathema). These apparent revisions became necessary as the standard of living and personal income rose in Western Europe resulting in increased pressure on socialist parties to promise to preserve and expand rather than totally destroy existing achievements.

The Russian-German alliance in 1939 had two dimensions. The Soviets considered fascism a later stage of capitalism and thus supported these movements in both Italy and Germany in order to hasten their fall. Stalin also stated at this time that there was no reason why two opposing powers should not cooperate in matters of common benefit. This was an early expression of peaceful coexistence.

During World War II, the Communist parties in Europe joined the loyalist underground movements which established them more firmly near the mainstream of political activity. During the war, the Soviets placed simple demands on the other Communist parties; it sought only a broad military support against the Germans and future security for the Soviet western borders. Also during this time, the Soviet Union dissolved the Comintern, which reduced the international appearance of the Communist movement and encouraged Togliatti, the leader of the Italian Communist Party, to articulate the emphasis on the national character of each party and formulate the principle of polycentrism which negates the central authority of Moscow.

In the years following World War II, the West European Communist
Parties reached a level of power and influence only equalled in the
present decade. By 1948, with Communists serving in coalition governments in Denmark, Norway, Iceland, Finland, Belgium, Luxembourg, France,
and Italy, the entire western world was alarmed with the rise of Communist
hegemony. The takeover of Czechoslovakia, the continued growth of party
strength in the French and Italian elections, and the Berlin blockade
all contributed to the rising tensions. Although the Soviets seemed
to be reaping huge gains from a crisis situation as significant as they

achieved at the end of the First World War, fortunately two events occurred in the Communist world which helped stem the surging flood and reverse the rise of communism in Western Europe.

The first event was the tactics of cold war adopted by the Soviet Union. This weakened the coalitions between the Communists and the socialists; in many countries, Communists were ejected from all government positions. The cold war unmasked the parties' loyalties to Moscow and Soviet interests. Interestingly, the loss of domestic power and influence did not appear substantially to weaken the commitment of the parties to proletarian internationalism, the expression of the inevitability of the worldwide class struggle. During this time, many parties supported Moscow on such issues as opposition to the Marshall Plan, which was obviously contrary to national interests.

The other event in the Communist world that slowed the spread of communism in the post-war years was the split between Tito and Stalin in 1948. Disagreeing with Moscow's practices of exercising hegemony over the internal affairs of parties in other states, Tito became the first to exercise the option of national communism. The international Communist movement was in a state of conflict at this time. With the dissolution of the Communist Internationale or Comintern in 1943, the following years witnessed considerable controversy over conflicting geographical, economic, and racial interests within the Communist sphere of influence. A new organization, the Cominform, was organized in 1947. One of the first acts of this new organization was to expel Tito, perhaps sowing the seed for the development of Eurocommunism, since the Yugoslavian Communist Party advocated independence, equality, autonomy, and non-interference by the USSR. 11

The renaissance of the influence of Communist parties in France and Italy dates from the 20th Congress of the CPSU in 1956 during which Khrushchev denounced Stalinism in his famous secret speech. He also at this time advocated peaceful coexistence and divergent models of economic development. These events had monumental significance as the way to detente began with the call for a sober appraisal of nuclear war and abandoning the concept of the inevitability of war.

Although this event did not result in an immediate emancipation, there was a gradual shift in party attitudes toward Moscow throughout Europe dating from this time. Initially, both the Italian and French parties supported the Russian actions in Hungary as necessary to preserve international security. After the Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960's, the independent spirit grew in the Italian party. This was especially apparent in 1968, when the Italian Communists denounced the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia.

The Italian party (Partito Communista Italiano - PCI), the largest Communist party in Western Europe has been the strongest advocate of polycentrism partially due to the political climate in Italy. There are seven major political parties in Italy and although always dominated by the Christian Democrats since World War II, there have been thirty-eight separate governments. The country has shifted during that time from agriculture to industry, increased its consumer orientation and vastly increased its civil service. The government has undergone changes from a coalition of national unity in 1945 to centrist in 1947, center left in 1962 to the present position of a proposed coalition between the Communist and Christian Democratic parties—the historic compromise.

The elections in 1976 resulted in a close vote, with the Christian Democrats gaining 35 percent and the Communists close behind with 33 percent. The Christian Democrats need the Communist Party's support in order to operate the government.

The PCI has capitalized on various problems in Italy, such as the breakdown of public order, inflated and inefficient government, increased labor costs, tax evasion, and a wasteful nationalization of the economy. The party has gained control of a majority of the urban governments throughout Italy, and controls six of the twenty regional governments.

The PCI campaigns on pragmatic promises of better schools, hospitals, courts, law and order, and a more efficient government. The Communists are emerging as givers in a country where politicians have been traditionally takers. The increasing success of the PCI has been largely due to consistency in economic and social programs as well as the attractiveness of its political ideals of democracy and autonomy. Throughout their recent rise to power, the Italian Communists have had to think the unthinkable and promote a concept of democracy and socialism unidentifiable in Marxism-Leninism. 14

The Communist Party in France (Parti Communiste Francais - PCF) has developed differently than the PCI. Since its founding in 1920, the PCF has been a pillar of conformity to the Marxist-Leninist model. The French Communists did not protest the Stalin purges of the 1930's and supported Russia during the Hitler-Stalin pact and even helped to sabotage the war effort in France until Germany invaded Russia. The PCF condemned the Marshall Plan, rejoiced as communism spread throughout Eastern Europe and did not protest either Hungary or Czechoslovakia.

The political climate in France has also been different than in Italy. No country in Western Europe has been so divided politically between the center and the left as France. Under the DeGaulle government, the fortunes of the PCF waned as their popular vote of twenty-eight percent in 1946 dropped to twenty percent in the late 1960's. The DeGaulle government left the PCF a rich legacy with its concentration of political power in one man, with a concomitant weakening of the elected assembly. Not able to achieve political power alone, the socialists and Communists have united on a platform stressing the need for democracy, and have developed a common program of government sponsorship of improved living and working conditions.

The traditional loyalty to Soviet policy by the PCF began to wane in the 1970's as the party proposed the concept of "Advanced Democracy." This concept of a nationalistic socialism in the colors of France spread rapidly, until suddenly in late 1975, the PCF made a drastic shift in emphasis by signing a joint declaration with the Italian and Spanish parties pledging a continued democratization of economic, social, and political life. The text of the statement sounds almost Jeffersonian with its proposals to foster and guarantee such liberties as thought and expression, free press, right of assembly, free movement of personnel, religious liberty, and the right to demonstrate as well as the democratic functioning of the state and the independence of justice. Since the signing of the declaration, the PCF has increased its expression of independence from Moscow, almost being overdemonstrative in its criticism of the treatment of dissent within the USSR.

The third member of the Latin European Communist group of parties is the small but not insignificant Spanish Communist Party (Partido Communista de Espana - PCE). This remarkable party existed as a clandestine party in exile in France until the recent death of Franco, when it returned to become the best organized opposition force in Spain during the period when the country is seeking new political directions among a myriad of political forces and groups. The PCE has had a profound influence internationally as an articulator of the spirit of independence from Moscow. After the 1956 speech by Khrushchev, the PCE was a leader in bluntly expressing the harmful effects of Stalinism on the international Communist movement. As early as 1966, the PCE began establishing ties with Italian and Rumanian parties. Enthusiastic about Dubcek's revisions in Czechoslovakia, the Spanish party led the strong condemnation of the Soviet actions. As a result, the PCE received the strongest censure from the Soviet press of any western party.

Domestically, the PCE has been seeking for fifteen years to establish legitimacy and recognition as a national party as their leader, Santiago Carillo, has been advocating communism with a human face. Though fighting unsuccessfully for legitimacy in its own country, the PCE presents a distinct challenge to the Soviet Union due to the power of its ideas, especially those encouraging a more regional focus of European Communists sharing the doctrine of independence from both the USSR and the US.

The autonomous efforts of these three main Western European Communist parties known as the historic compromise in Italy, advanced democracy in France, and national reconciliation in Spain have been drawn more closely

together as the result of two sobering developments in the 1970's.

In 1974, the government of Salvador Allende in Chile was overthrown, ending the threat of a Communist government in that strifetorn country. In the same year, the Portuguese Communist Party, having been in internal exile since 1926, suddenly undertook a preemptive attempt to seize control of the government by stepping into a power vacuum caused by the collapse of a government torn by economic disaster, colonial disintegration and political subversion. The actions of the Portuguese Communists under Alvaro Cunhal flouted the electoral verdict and seized control of numerous elements of national life in an attempt to gain power. This was considered by the west as a frontal attack on cherished ideals of democratic pluralism and free enterprise. 17

These experiences in Chile and Portugal strengthened the convictions of the Latin European Communist Parties that the road to power lay independent of the influence of Moscow. Chile demonstrated the importance of the support of broad political forces such as the Roman Catholic Church and other moderates; Portugal proved that a revolutionay coup, not supported by the military, probably will not work in a western country. 18

This examination of the history of communism in Europe serves as an important foundation for the remaining criteria by which to measure the significance of the Communist parties of Latin Europe. Several factors may be gained from the historical perspective including the fact that the history of communism has proceeded in waves and troughs, Communist parties have made substantial gains from crises artifically manufactured

as well as crises not of their own making (World War I, the Great Depression, World War II, etc.), and communism has been through numerous revisions, accommodations and shifts in tactics. Having evolved under different circumstances, the Communist parties in Western Europe have prospered in direct proportion to their adaptation to their own unique circumstances.

The Latin European Communist Parties are today in much the same position as the Russian Communists after the October Revolution. As the Bolsheviks awoke in 1920 to find themselves alone with the Russian masses, the so-called Eurocommunists find themselves alone today with the people of their own countries. Their success and failure does not depend on guidance from Moscow but rather what they do themselves. 19

CHAPTER II

FOOTNOTES

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 - 2. Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled, p. 29.
 - 3. Ibid.
 - 4. R. V. Burks, ed., The Future of Communism in Europe, p. 35.
 - 5. Fainsod, pp. 36-38.
 - 6. Ibid., p. 47.
 - 7. Uliassi, p. 295.
- 8. Donald L. M. Blackmer and Annie Kriegel, <u>The International Role of the Communist Parties of Italy and France</u>, p. 7.
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 - 10. Ibid., p. 39.
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- 14. Sergio Serge, "The Communist Question in Italy," Foreign Affairs, July 1976, p. 700.
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CHAPTER III

THE IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

"We have no experience whatever of how we can and should lead the struggle for socialism in a region of advanced capitalism There do not exist even implicit indications in the classics of our doctrine."

Palmiro Togliatti

In the last chapter, a historical examination revealed that the real strength of communism in Western Europe lay in the southern region. The character of the parties in this region, particularly in France, Italy, and Spain, was determined to be revisionist—cast in the mold of national communism and polycentrism advocated by Togliatti in Italy and Tito in Yugoslavia.

While these parties today advocate autonomy from the CPSU and profess sweeping guarantees of personal freedom and liberty, they adamantly remain Communist parties. In this chapter, an attempt will be made to interrelate history and ideology in order to determine the extent to which these parties remain committed to the ideological precepts of Marxism-Leninism which is inherently and diametrically opposed to the very political and social freedoms these parties so vigorously espouse.

The basic ideology of Marx and Engels--the inevitability of the fall of capitalism--was expanded and adapted by Lenin to include two important concepts: the theory of the party and the theory of the latte. The theory of the party involved the creation of a small, highly disciplined, professional revolutionary elite. The state,

in Lenin's ideology becomes the executor serving the party and its objectives with all of its processes (laws, courts, police, military, etc.) designed to serve the exclusive interests of a classless society.

Since this utopian government cannot be constructed by any existing capitalist state, Lenin proposed that all states must be overthrown and replaced by a new state form led by the party acting for the working class or proletariat. This resulting dictatorship of the proletariat is destined to build a classless society that will eventually lead to the termination of the necessity for the state. Thus strict Leninists are committed to the overthrow of the established system of government.

Marxism-Leninism refutes the existence of supernatural forces or a creator. The ideology is dedicated to independent reason centered on reality and materialism. Highly "scientific" and systems oriented, Communists are deeply influenced by Marx's interpretation of history and are eternal optimists about the future, which they feel belongs to them. Communists view Marxism-Leninism as all encompassing—a guide for action, a basis for revolutionary policy, a compass for scientific endeavors and even a perspective for art and literature.

The Marxist-Leninist world view effects both the domestic and foreign policies of Communist parties. Marx viewed mankind as passing through a succession of socioeconomic formations each characterized by a distinctive mode of material production. Thus there is no such concept as society per se according to Marx--only society at a definite stage of development. Also in the Marxist-Leninist outlook, the nation is insignificant since the population of every capitalist state is split into two antagonistic classes--the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.³

The ideological basis for communism—dialectical materialism—is an important philosophy to help understand the seeming incongruities and inconsistencies in many Communist actions and conflicting doctrines. Dialectical materialism places value on the creative potential of clashing ideas. The highest truth (synthesis) can only be reached according to this theory by the clash of a thesis and its antithesis. Thus in Italy and France today we see parties professing freedom, while retaining relations with the USSR, a totalitarian society. 4

The dynamics of ideology in the Communist parties of Latin Europe can best be seen by examining what Kriegel calls the "flying buttresses" of communism: the dictatorship of the proletariat, proletarian internationalism, and democratic centralism.

As mentioned above, the dictatorship of the proletariat is the embodiment of Lenin's contempt for political change by parliamentary means. Ignoring the will of the majority, the party elite must forcibly seize power and govern for the masses using the state merely as a tool. The backwardness of the Russian proletariat as well as the isolation of the Soviets as the only ruling Communist party contributed to the evolution of party rule as a dictatorship without the proletariat. Stalinism grew out of Leninism and saw the concept of socialism in one country lead the party to a totalitarian dictatorship. The concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat is a political handicap to parties professing pluralism because it does not conceive of any freedom for enemies of the party. For this reason, the Communist parties of Latin Europe have one by one abandoned the term in their press.

Proletarian internationalism embodying the inevitability of the world class struggle and revolution was the initial driving force behind the international Communist movement. It has been promoted by Soviet organizations such as the Comintern, the Cominform, and at their international party congresses. It has included major party revisions such as socialism in one country and peaceful coexistence and has been the catalyst behind the Soviet concept of the inseparability of foreign and domestic policy. Proletarian internationalism is also reflected in the seeming contradictions in foreign policy of the USSR that exhibit both confrontation and stability simultaneously in relationships with capitalist states.

Proletarian internationalism is the sphere of ideology most endangered in the current Soviet crisis of authority as the Southern European parties exhibit their independent spirit, however, it should be remembered that Communists have been less prone to shape their foreign policy by ideology than the socialists, preferring to remain more flexible, adaptable, and pragmatic with policy emanating from strategic requirements. Although the Italian road to socialism, socialism in the colors of France, and national reconciliation are slogans promoted by the Latin Communists as a new internationalism contrary to Leninist doctrine, the fact remains that socialist parties have embraced patriotism periodically and even the Soviet Union has rallied its people to stand behind the cause of the motherland in such actions as the Great Patriotic War. 8

Both the dictatorship of the proletariat and proletarian internationalism were among the twenty-one basic conditions required for admission to the Comintern in the 1920's. Only one of these conditions remains in universal use among Communist parties today—democratic centralism.

Democratic centralism is the practice of inner party discipline with iron clad vertical authority springing from a highly centralized leadership. All three of the Latin European Communist parties strictly adhere to this type of internal organization, which raises justifiable questions concerning their sincerity about a commitment to democratic ideals. If the Communist parties in these countries really believe in freedom of ideas, why do they suppress freedom within their own party structure by inhibiting free speech and expelling dissenters?

The importance of democratic centralism is best understood by recognizing that in the Soviet model of communism, ideology has been a driving force behind its socialist society. The PCI believes that the Russian ideological model provides a myth for its members to believe in. The existence of the party in Russia, though not perfect, provides proof of the attainability of socialism as a major political force.

The myth of the state has required momentum to keep it viable since ideology is not the cement holding society together in the Soviet Union. Discipline is the cohesive force—thus the vital importance of democratic centralism.

While the PCF has remained loyal to the Soviet Union until recently, the PCI has a long history of influencing revisionist thought. Gramsci, the first leader of the PCI, was highly critical of what he referred to as mechanistically deterministic Marxism. He emphasized the role of the intellect and will in politics and stressed

politically expedient activities such as cooperation with the Catholic Church in countries that are predominantly Catholic. 12

Togliatti carried the Italian emphasis further after World War II as the need for revisionism became stronger in Western Europe due to rising standards of income and living conditions among the working people. The Togliatti influence, together with the diversity of opinion in Eastern Europe, contributed to emphasize the many roads to socialism in Khrushchev's 1956 secret speech. That emphasis was a major turning point in the influence of Soviet ideology in the west.

Ideology can be overemphasized. World War II was an ideological war--dedicated to overthrowing and changing the conquered societies. The USSR uses its military when ideology fails; however, it prefers to engage in such activities as arms sales, security agreements, and the securing of base rights rather than resorting to intervention like it had to in both Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

One dimension of ideology that is seldom used in relation to
European Communist parties is the aspect of morals and ethics. Communists reject theoretically capitalist moral codes and religions, considering them to be instruments of the ruling class. As Solzhenitsyn has repeatedly warned—Communists have never concealed the fact that they reject all absolute concepts of morality and that they consider morality to be relative. This factor is critical as long as the Latin European Communist parties build their popularity on promises. The promises probably have questionable value if keeping promises is not part of basic party ideology.

The PCI does not appear to share in the traditional anti-religious views of hard-line Communists. Having achieved monumental compromises with the Vatican, the PCI has used the church as an interlocutor between political power and the party. ¹⁴ There are those who fear that the cooperation of the PCI with the church is but a political expedient and that the Communists may be merely seducing the class enemies Marx and Lenin wanted to destroy.

The historical despotic nature of the Communist parties that have gained governmental control gives considerable evidence of the continuing commitment of Communists to the basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism. The idealistic nature of Communist world view, its dogmatic approach to class warfare and its economic determinism have all introduced a discontinuity into history. Communism is a vision of man's mind displacing God as the creative intelligence in the world thus depriving man of his sense of divine origin and dignity and reducing him to merely an object in the inevitable stream of history.

Although the Communist parties of Latin Europe have dropped the concepts of dictatorship of the proletariat and proletarian internationalism, considering the practice of democratic centralism and the moral and ethical background of Marxist-Leninism, one is justified in questioning their political credibility.

CHAPTER III

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CHAPTER IV

THE POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE

"Those who refuse to believe the PCI would not believe that a giraffe was real when they first saw it because it was too different."

Togliatti

There is much apprehension and uncertainty in both the East and the West concerning the rapid increase in influence of the Communist parties in Italy and France during the past few years. Having examined both the historical and ideological dimensions of these Communist parties, further insight can be gained by comparing their domestic and international political attitudes and actions.

Both Italy and France have unique political environments. Italy, the poorest and the least productive of the western industrial nations, has a public payroll benefitting a large percentage of the population, while many workers are already retired on official pension plans. Much of the economy is already in government hands or rigidly subject to government controls which greatly hinder private business or multinational corporations.

In Italy, a worker can be discharged only with great difficulty, workers are entitled to not work for health reasons without any documented proof and businesses can be ruined by sudden strikes. The country is plagued with numerous problems in housing, education, transportation, health care, conservation of soil and water resources, as well as high unemployment and inflation. This porous domestic

environment provides many opportunities for the PCI to take action and exercise the influence it has gained through its representation throughout the governmental structure, especially at the local level.

Additionally, the party controls much of the media, theater, and the schools.

The domestic politics of the PCI can best be understood by viewing the anatomy of popular support. The vote for the PCI is composed of the following elements: 10%, hard-line party leadership; 20%, members of labor unions who support the leadership; 40%, idealist nonviolent Marxist young adults and students; 20%, non-party members who vote to support specific programs; and 10%, consisting of the extreme radical left who are critical of the leadership but have no political base of their own. ²

Politically, the PCI is no longer working as an opposition force but is working to achieve a social evolution. Key to their strategy is an attempted coalition with its principal opposition, the Christian Democrats. This so-called historic compromise is significant since the Italian word compromesso does not mean the give and take relationship taken for granted in the United States, but merely means a mutual agreement or co-promise. Berlinguer himself has stated:

The strategy of historic compromise cannot be reduced to a government coalition. It is something much broader. It is a form of cooperation in society and in the institutions of the great Communist, socialist and catholic popular currents. Within this process, various governmental formulas are possible.³

Under the <u>compromesso</u>, the political climate would make a Communist controlled government more easily attainable.

The political climate in France is dominated by a highly centralized administration consisting of ministerial positions held by graduates of a

national administrative school. Thus in France the Communist party does not control a single important national governmental position at this time. As mentioned before, the country has seen a concentration of power in one position—the President—so that the country that helped in the evolution of representative democracy has seen its elected assembly's political power greatly reduced. The economic power of the country is also in the hands of a few industrial and financial firms. The PCF has been capitalizing upon this repressive centralization by campaigning on the need for a more democratic representation in government and greater economic determinism.

Due to its traditional loyalty to Moscow, the PCF has been more concerned with international affairs than the PCI. The PCF has also had greater experience in coalition activities dating back to the days of the popular fronts. The latest coalition is the union de la gauche, an alliance with the French Socialist Party with its Programme commun, a 140-page document outlining strong all-inclusive democratic reforms of the government, economy and society.

Both the PCI and the PCF are embarked on a difficult and often contradictory domestic political road which involves improving the image at home by the exploitation of any tactical advantage offered by any situation while at the same time sustaining membership in the international Communist movement and continuing to benefit from both direct and indirect financial benefits from the USSR and Eastern Europe.

The relationship with Moscow is the greatest political fear in the west. As mentioned in the last chapter, the parties are still Marxist-Leninist in their internal operations and contain a second layer of

hard-line members who could dispose of leaders more attractive to the west such as Berlinguer and Marchais once the electorate placed the government in their hands. There are also some doubts as to the ability of the coalition parties in either Italy or France being able to survive after they helped win the election. Amere independence from Moscow is not a guarantee of a commitment to democratic ideals. When Tito detached himself from the Soviet Union he did not institute free election or independent courts. Neither did China, Albania, or Rumania.

It is feared that as long as Communist parties retain their revolutionary economic, social, and cultural programs they will be compelled to use force, coercion and possibly a totalitarian dictatorship to implement these programs once they achieve power. The historical evidence of Communist regimes wherever located and however initiated substantiate the consistency of the Soviet model. The promises to alternate or step down if defeated in democratic elections has little significance considering that both the PCI and PCF optimistically believe that once they gain power the people will never vote them out. The legitimate question is—would the people ever get a chance?

In summary, the domestic political actions of the PCI and PCF vary in direct proportion to the differences in the political climate in the two countries. The PCI is typically Italian: opportunistic, idealistic, and inconsistent. Being Italian, it is not taken as seriously by other Europeans as perhaps it should be. The PCF, remaining loyal to Moscow until recent times, now is pursuing an autonomous road with all the vigor and industry typical of its people. Characteristically, the PCF has become highly nationalistic although this is not a political ideal

espoused by Marxism. Moscow has only supported nationalistic movements when they have been to its benefit because its ostensible purpose is to eliminate national differences and unite all peoples into a classless society. The invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia stand as grim reminders that national self-determination independent of Soviet influence is not considered to be in the best interests of the Soviet Union. 7

In the sphere of international politics, the Communist parties of Latin Europe can be judged by their attitudes concerning foreign policy actions by the USSR and its East European satellites and by their proposed programs concerning such matters as European integration and collective security.

The basic framework for the foreign policy of Communist parties, especially the CPSU lie in the changing political forces in the world today. Some of the most significant of these changes include the increase in strength and influence of socialist parties; basic anti-imperialist attitudes of the third world countries; rising political maturity of the working class; the crisis in the economic and political super-structures in the west; reduction in tensions between the two superpowers; the slowdown in European integration; the progressive tendencies of Catholicism; and the increased independence of West European Communist parties. 8

According to Marxism-Leninism, foreign policy cannot be separated from domestic policy as the two are mutually supporting. The USSR has continually promoted the international class struggle, even during the time it was advocating socialism in one country. Its maneuvers have included maintaining friendly relations with a country while simultaneously promoting subversion within its borders. The Soviet strategy

has included international Communist organizations such as the Cominform and Comintern, the weakening of capitalist colonies, competition to close the technological gap, cold war and now peaceful coexistence.

Both the PCI and the PCF have a varied history of reactions to foreign policy activities of the USSR. The degree of PCI support for the Soviet position changed from that of the Hungarian intervention in 1956, when Togliatti supported the Soviet actions as necessary to preserve international security, to its condemnation of the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Opposition to Soviet foreign policy has been rare in the PCF until recently, when the party joined the PCI in criticizing the Soviet treatment of dissent. While the PCI supported the Soviet positions on Israel in 1973 and the MPLA in Angola in 1976, both the PCI and PCF were the leaders in stressing autonomy at both the 25th CPSU Congress and the Berlin Conference in 1976. The international significance of their actions is that Berlinguer stresses that the Italian road to socialism lays within the framework of present international alliances (NATO and the EEC), while both parties embrace the concept of the secular, non-ideological nature of the state and politics.

A more detailed look at the criticisms of Moscow by both the PCF and the PCI reveals that the most thorough criticisms are directed at the past--especially the Stalinist past. A majority of the criticisms can be categorized as good domestic press.

The position of the West European Communist Parties on key international issues such as NATO, the Atlantic Alliance and European integration has been contradictory. In recent years the PCI has taken a stand ostensibly favorable to NATO; however, toleration can hardly be classified as loyalty. As late as 1972, Berlinguer was urging Italy to be free from the bonds and hindrance of NATO, but by 1976 he had changed his approach and was calling it a shield protecting the individualism of the Italian way to socialism. In the last election, General Nino Pasti, former Deputy Supreme Allied Commander in Europe for Nuclear Affairs, ran for office on the Communist Party ticket. The domestic orientation of the PCI makes it qualify its support of NATO with a pledge to eventually free Italy from American hegemony and to work for the eventual dissolution of both military blocs. The situation in France and Spain are different. France withdrew its forces from the control of the NATO alliance several years ago. Spain has never been a member, and the Spanish Communist Party supports the position that it should not join.

The rise of the PCI could significantly weaken the NATO southern flank by eliminating Italian participation in nuclear planning, possible curtailment of US base rights, and limiting host nation logistical support. Communists in government positions in any of the West European countries would probably not support military spending and bilateral defense treaties. Additionally, the participation of Communists in governments in either Italy or France could weaken US congressional support for NATO, since congressmen might feel that the threat of the USSR to Europe was reduced by their presence.

The PCF has been traditionally hostile toward the Atlantic Alliance, partially due to the Alliance's basically centrist support and partially due to its historical loyalty to Moscow. Today, however, its common program with the socialists calls for continuation in the alliance, signing of nuclear non-proliferation treaties, non-aggression pacts with the Warsaw Pact, and participation in disarmament and mutual balanced force reduction talks. The question remains how much of the common program would be implemented after an election.

The question of European integration is complicated by the desire of both the PCF and the PCI for the best possible relations with both the East and the West. Close ties with either the US and the USSR are sometimes contrary to policies in relationship with the European Economic Community.

Neither the PCI nor the PCF originally supported the EEC. The PCF is traditionally against any supranational organization; however, its common program with the socialists supports European integration, providing it is beneficial to workers and remains free from outside domination. The PCI has increased its support but also wants a shift in emphasis to the workers to prevent hegemony by Western monopolistic interests.

The Spanish Communist Party would like to see Spain become a member of the Community in order to strengthen its economy. The Communists could have a substantial voice in a strong European Parliament if it were allowed to develop; however, as the countries of Western Europe progress towards goals of economic interdependence and eventual political accord, the Communist Parties have difficulty sustaining any position of support since they prefer to maintain their nationalistic domestic position.

In summary, the political attitudes of the Latin Communist Parties are varied both domestically and internationally. The French are

basically doctrinaire, ideological and suspicious, while the Italians are more pragmatic and tolerant, yet reluctant to compromise any vital interests. The political climate in the entire region has driven the parties to place their principal emphasis on domestic survival.

Because of this domestic orientation, by far the most significant contemporary influence on the international political attitudes of the Communist Parties of Western Europe has been the reduction of tensions between the superpowers known as peaceful coexistence or detente.

Although frequently strained by an almost compulsive one-upsmanship on the part of Moscow and an overly optimistic attitude by the United States, detente has remained the major factor in East-West relations during the past five years. Evaluations of the impact of detente are mixed. Some consider it an umbrella, however leaky, over the two superpowers while others view it as merely a smoke screen which has replaced the old iron curtain. Clouded by differing perceptions due to different ideological frames of reference, the period of detente has been one of mixed relationships, encompassing not only some constraint and cooperation, but also continuing if not intensified competition.

This most recent era of peaceful coexistence dates from the 29th Party Congress of the CPSU in 1956. At that time, an analysis of what the Soviets call the correlation of forces--those aspects of political, economic, military, and socio-psychological forces that make up national power--revealed that these forces were shifting in their favor worldwide; therefore, war was no longer inevitable and socialism could win with the Clausewitzian alternative--politics. One Soviet professor has noted that if the world correlation of forces should shift away from the Soviet Union,

it would be considered counter-revolutionary as were the events in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. 16

Detente has also contributed to the acceleration of the domestic influence of the Communist Parties in Western Europe, since the more open political environment resulting from a relaxation of tensions has allowed the parties to come out of isolation. The parties have been able to express their independence due to the shield provided by the balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Berlinquer stated before the 1976 Italian election, "I feel more secure on this side of the Atlantic Pact." 17

However, the major question concerning the Eurocommunists' relationship to detente remains whether they will upset the balance of power upon which detente rests. The balance is as important to them as it is to the superpowers, since an increase in tensions could curtail the progressive economic and social programs that have allowed the Latin Communists to thrive.

The domestic political environment of the Eurocommunists has also been affected by the implementation of the Helsinki agreements. The Soviets have sought to concentrate on the policies emphasizing security that have a strong European impact, such as SALT, MBFR, the withdrawal of US troops, reduction of military budgets and the eventual dissolution of all existing blocs and alliances. Also impacting upon European politics has been the United States' emphasis on seeking gains in human rights and the freer movement of people and ideas. Helsinki has created a pan-European outlook that has placed the Eurocommunists in the position of

being a double edged sword capable of striking at either the East or the West, or both.

The Soviet Union has much to fear if the sword strikes their way.

Any weakening of their grip on Eastern Europe threatens their security barrier, their economic relations with those countries, their last remnants of a once universal international Communist leadership and possibly even the legitimacy of their own totalitarian model within their own country.

18 Just which side will suffer the greatest political damage from the Eurocommunists will have to be decided in the future.

CHAPTER IV

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CHAPTER V

PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

In relatively good times the Italian Communist Party has become more Italian. In relatively bad times it has become more Communist. The party wants to be both"

William E. Colby Ex-director of the CIA

"There is a specter haunting Europe--the specter of communism."

These words opened the famous Communist Manifesto of Marx and Engels.

An examination of communism as it has evolved in Western Europe during the past decade in the perspective of history, ideology, politics and its relationship to detente reveals that there is still a specter haunting Europe, but the specter possibly has changed. Conclusions and analyses of numerous specialists and observers are polarized into two distinct viewpoints. One viewpoint is that the specter haunting Europe is the specter of Eurocommunism.

The term Eurocommunism is deceptive. Leaders of the West European Parties, including Berlinguer, Carillo, Marchais and Cunhal all strongly deny the validity of the term. It is said to have been coined by Arrigo Levi, an Italian journalist; however, the term has had widespread usage since 1975. Even though Carillo calls the term unfortunate, he has offered an excellent definition by calling it a definite ideological trend arising from specific conditions and historical climate in which the leftist forces in the south of Europe operate. The basic premises of Eurocommunism at this time include a rejection of the universal validity of the Soviet model of socialism, a disavowal of any claim to a

monopoly of power, and a policy of creating broad coalitions of political forces to resolve economic and social problems. 3

Some Communist commentators feel that Eurocommunism is a Western plot to divide communism into ruling and non-ruling parties. Hardline Communists in Eastern Europe view Eurocommunism as ideological subversion, especially because the emphasis of West European communism has been away from proletarian internationalism and revolutionary struggle. Such critics fear the Eurocommunists have become politically disoriented in their Western capitalist environment. Some East Europeans also fear that the West has introduced the concept of Eurocommunism to distract attention from the struggle against monopoly by presenting certain West European parties as anti-Soviet and thus provoking disputes among fraternal parties.

Eurocommunism is not an organized, well integrated monolithic movement. But neither is it a myth. It is a tendency for these parties to give priority to their own political interests as they are adapting to their environments. The term Euro-communism could almost be considered a slang expression for the more tolerant and moderate emphasis of Communist practice common to France, Italy and Spain.

This specter of Eurocommunism haunts Western Europe. As Communist Parties come closer to success in national elections they may present a distinct challenge to Western democratic traditions as well as Western international organizations. The analyses of the previous chapters demonstrate that there are justifications for these fears.

The purges, brutal interventions and totalitarian nature of ruling Communist Parties are public record. Any observer can see that all of

the seventeen Communist Parties that have achieved governmental control since 1917 allow little political opposition or cultural freedom. (All the freedoms promised by the PCI and PCF are contained in the Soviet constituion.) The free democratic society promised by the Communists of Latin Europe is incompatible with their government-imposed and regulated economic system.

While Eurocommunists promise a multiparty system with free elections, critics point out that there is a second layer of hard-line Communists in the parties who could conceivably displace their revisionist leaders once the party has government control. Interestingly most of the concessions given by the Eurocommunists to appease their alliance partners never sacrifice the basic methods of communism, leaving the parties the capability of eliminating both allies and elections once power is gained. The democratic promises so boldly proclaimed by the parties are always for the future--promises, not actions. Fortunately there are still those in the West who remember that the Communists are notorious liars and treaty breakers. 5

Some Western observers have enthusiastically embraced the seemingly changing nature of the Eurocommunists. There has been a tendency perhaps to exaggerate the significance of these changes. Criticisms of Moscow by the Western Parties are usually directed at regimes of the past rather than the present. Considering that the French have done such a sudden about face, suspicion of the sincerity of the parties is warranted. As recently as 1970, a French Communist Party leader was expelled from the party for proposing the very ideas now unanimously ebraced by the party membership.

The electoral process touted by the PCF and PCI does not equate with democratic processes of the West. The PCF would alter all electoral boundaries to favor the left once in power while the PCI works today in a political environment that has decided the results of elections in backroom negotiations for years. Solzhenitsyn has been adamant about the danger of Communist deception and the apparent gullibility of the West. He articulates this fear freely in his speeches using such Russian proverbs such as: "When it happens to you, you'll know it's true" and "Catch on you will, when you're tumbling downhill." The big question remains—is Eurocommunism a trap?

The specter of Eurocommunism also haunts the closest ally of Western Europe -- the United States. As a super power, the United States shares the uncertainty and challenges presented by the presence of Communists in West European governments. The influence of such political changes is a problem and a danger shared by both super powers. The United States has had particular difficulty articulating an evenhanded policy to cope with the situation. Secretary of State Kissinger expressed a policy that the participation of Communists in West European governments was unacceptable to the United States. Kissinger's approach has been recently supplanted by an official position statement of non-involvement in West European electoral processes. According to this latest policy, the position of Communist Parties in individual countries is a matter to be decided upon by the electorate; however, it states that the United States' ability to work with a country dominated by a Communist Party would be severely impaired. The United States may have difficulty distinguishing the dividing line between participation and domination.

Another view of the changing specter haunting Europe is that the specter is democracy. Although the Soviet Union works in a confident ideological sphere embracing the inevitability of the decline of capitalism (which allows them not to be in a hurry), Soviet leaders can become almost paranoid when the balance of power or correlation of forces shifts to any position unfavorable to their vital interests.

Since the rise of Communist Parties in Western Europe portends a weakening of the NATO alliance, the Soviets fear an unstable Europe could force Germany to move even further into its rearmament, including developing its own nuclear weapons. Profiting from detente, the USSR has been enjoying a comfortable relationship with the present West European governments and possibly would be threatened by governments controlled by Communists they can't control with military power. Previously discussed has been the waning influence of the USSR over international communism exacerbated by the influence of the Eurocommunists at conferences which has resulted in the institutionalization of unity in diversity in the Communist world.

The specter of democracy as promoted by the West European Communist Parties haunts the Soviet Union with uneasiness about its influence in Eastern Europe. Carillo and others predict that the West European model of socialism (which has its roots in Yugoslavia) will eventually be emulated by Eastern Europe. Since the stability maintained by the presence of the Soviet army in those countries is an expensive strain on Soviet resources, the USSR probably would prefer to have strong, stable and progressive governments which allow Communist participation

in Western Europe as this would cause them the least difficulty at the present time.

The opening statements of the Communist Manifesto also read that all the forces in Europe have united to exorcise the haunting specter. After the split between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks in 1903, Lenin wrote a book titled "What is to be done?" Is anything being done today in either the East or the West to unite forces to prevent the rising influence of Eurocommunism from upsetting the balance of power? If not, what is to be done?

The Soviets are at a stalemate. At a time when they are seeking renewed influence over international communism, they cannot afford to discourage or block successful bids for power by the Western Communist Parties, but at the same time, they cannot afford to indorse the liberalization of Marxist-Leninism and the promoting of personal liberties and political pluralism by these same parties. This could threaten their tenuous control over Eastern Europe as greatly as it was threatened during the decade of de-Stalinization and the Sino-Soviet split.

Now is the time for the United States to affirm a positive position towards the Communist Parties in Western Europe. The basis for its position should evolve from a realistic appraisal of the various options available. Starting with an assessment of the political climate in Western Europe, I believe that the Communist Parties are in an ascendant position, but that this ascendancy can be slowed down and even skillfully turned to the advantage of the West, especially within the framework of detente.

The situation is different in each of the three countries we have considered in this study. In Spain, where over 200 political factions have been maneuvering for influence during the seventeen months since Franco's death, Premier Adolfo Suarez has sought to demonstrate the strength of his country's new found democracy by legalizing the Communist Party, which had been outlawed since the Spanish Civil War. I believe that despite this action, which has caused division among the non-Communist forces in Spain, the political climate will remain unfavorable for significant Communist Party gains in the near future. During this time, a successful US policy in Italy and France would probably favorably affect relations in Spain also.

In France, the Communist threat is definitely tempered by the PCF's coalition with the Socialists. The coalition of the Left has benefited the Socialists more than the Communists. The Socialist's position of senior status in the alliance as well as strained relations at times with the PCF gives hope for a potential Leftist government that would be pro-Western and non-Communist. The potential strength of the Socialist Party and its leader, François Mitterand, provides a key to the US policy in dealing with communism in France.

The PCI remains the most probable Communist Party to ascend to power in Western Europe in the near future. However, the best the party can accomplish is a position in a coalition government in which it would share ministries with the Christian Democrats. The early debates as to whether the United States will accept Communist participation in Western governments is now a moot point, since the Italian Communists already do participate in government, albeit quietly. The Christian Democrats

continue to maintain their status, partially due to promises not to make an alliance with the Communists. 12 Italy is a strange paradox: it cannot reform and survive as a democratic country without PCI support of the Christian Democrats; but, it also cannot survive if the PCI's support disrupts and splits the internal structure of the CDP. 13 The PCI must maintain its support of the CDP in order to strengthen its image as a "human faced," government-supporting party. Within this ambiguity lies another key to the US strategy regarding Eurocommunism.

I believe that the United States' attitudes during the period of detente has been too concerned with change in Western Europe while being overly cautious and almost acquiescent regarding the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe. This decided weakness in the Kissinger approach allowed no accommodation to Communist Parties in Western Europe, while at the same time, Sonnenfeldt proposed seeking an organic relationship between the USSR and the Communist nations of Eastern Europe. This approach spread confusion among the East and West alike. Even the Communist paper Le Monde christened Sonnenfeldt's proposals the "Brezhfeldt Doctrine."

I believe that the US policy in Europe should be flexible, and allow for a greater acceptance of diversity and change, not only in Western Europe, where domestic politics are in a state of reform, but also in Eastern Europe, where accomplishments of detente could lead to greater internal liberalization. A more realistic approach to Europe is not without precedent in US foreign policy. Most recently, in relationships with China, the United States was able to set aside prior preconceptions and rethink old patterns in an effort to gain political advantages by changing policy. 15

The foundation of a more tolerant US policy in Western Europe would be a realistic assessment and exploitation of the strengths of Western liberal democracy. After all, it is the open, free and pluralistic Western environment that makes it difficult to prevent change in the first place.

While one alternative is to believe that the ascension of the Communist Parties to government in Italy and France is inevitable and that the United States should make overtures to the parties to preserve a chance of influence when they are in office, I feel that the United States should accept the limited Communist parliamentary participation as it exists today in both Italy and France and concentrate on strengthening non-Communist political forces. The more centrist parties, although threatened, are by no means crushed by the evolution of strong Communist Parties. Many of these forces are very strong, particularly the Christian Democrats in Italy. In fact, the CDP provides a "stable instability." ¹⁶

The vote of the youth in the 1976 Italian election did not swing as overwhelmingly to the PCI as expected. In France, the Socialist Party has gained substantial support from the electorate, while the PCF has shown a slight decline. The influence of a democratic Europe has thus far helped three nations--Spain, Portugal and Greece--survive the transition from a dictatorship without serious civil war and revolution. 17

There are many ways in which the United States and its allies can exert influence to strengthen West European democratic forces. The European Economic Community and the Atlantic Alliance are powerful political

and economic instruments. The economic interdependence of the EEC combined with commercial ties with the United States provide a strong force to militate against the emergence of a one-party Communist state.

The common program of the Left in France has pushed the PCF into a less antagonistic attitude toward these institutions. No Western European country can avoid involvement in the highly interrelated trade, monetary, investment and technological networks that now affect between one-fourth to one-half of their gross national products.

The United States should avoid the option of either overt or covert political intervention in West Europe and should not use its economic involvement as too strong a weapon since these actions could alienate the non-Communist forces as well as push the Communists back towards Moscow. At the same time, the United States needs to be careful while supporting non-Communist forces that are in coalitions with Communist Parties that no indication of support for the Communists is given. Concentration must always be on strengthening Western institutions such as the EEC, NATO and the Atlantic Alliance since it is through these organizations that the most significant policies can be executed. Leadership for such a strengthening is decidedly lacking today. It is a challenge for the United States to provide that leadership. 20

The United States has little to lose by developing a more tolerant, even-handed attitude toward political diversity in Western Europe. With a more open US approach, the probability of drastic change in the near future is much less. There is little danger of a Communist dominated government in the near future in Western Europe and even less likelihood of a Communist takeover. ²¹

Particularly significant is that a Western government which did include Communist Party ministers would present as great a challenge to the stability of "Soviet Europe" as to the stability of "American Europe." While there are some who advocate that Eurocommunists in a coalition government fully accepted by the West would encourage greater independence of the East European countries from the Soviets, an opposite scenario postulates a West European country ruled by Eurocommunists upsetting and weakening the Atlantic Alliance thus disturbing the pre-conditions of detente with a resulting increase in Soviet domination of Eastern Europe. A flexible US position could probably prevent any extreme imbalance from occurring.

Care must be taken not to repeat the near fatal mistakes of the past. Many American and British leaders welcomed the rise of Mussolini when his nationalistic and mild form of dictatorship (fascism with a human face) cleaned up the cities, suppressed the Mafia, and made the trains run on time. The West also refused to support the tottering German Republic when support might have saved it, and then gave strong support and cooperation to Hitler when it should have been refused. Care must also be taken in dealing with the Eurocommunists themselves since many of their statements and promises bear striking resemblance to those advanced by Hungarian, Bulgarian and Polish Communist leaders after World War II just prior to their seizure of power. 23

One fact is certain--the Communist Parties in Western Europe will remain a destabilizing influence throughout Europe and perhaps the world for some time to come. Eurocommunism is neither a myth nor a

monolith; however, the divided Communist movement it possibly is germinating could prove to present an even greater challenge to the West than the monolithic Stalinist model. Nevertheless, the United States and its Western allies should react to the challenge confidently, knowing that the influence of Eurocommunism is primarily destabilizing because the parties have been compelled to become more democratic. By analyzing why the Communists in Western Europe changed in the first place, the West can perhaps develop programs to enhance this obvious need for more equality, liberty and democratic participation in government.

There are dangers to the East and West alike as the Eurocommunists venture into Western political institutions. But it is the solidarity of these institutions that the West has the least to fear. 24

CHAPTER V

FOOTNOTES

- 1. "Hungarian Ideologist Discusses Eurocommunism." <u>Radio</u>
 <u>Free Europe Research Background Report</u> / 29 (Hungary), 4 Feb
 1977, p. 1.
 - 2. Borba (Belgrade), 8 January 1977.
- 3. Charles Gatti, "The Europeanization of Communism?" Foreign Affairs, April 1977, pp. 541-542.
- 4. "The Hungarian Party's Cautious Interest in Eurocommunism," Radio Free Europe Research Background Report / 18 (Hungary), 26 Jan 1977, p. 1.
- 5. James Burnham, "Come to My Parlor," National Review, 5 March 1976, p. 207.
- 6. Kevin Devlin, "The Challenge of Eurocommunism," <u>Problems in Communism</u>, Jan-Feb 1977, p. 19.
- 7. "State Department to Steer Clear of West European Voting," Washington Post, 7 April 1977, p. A-14.
 - 8. Burton Pines, "Red Star Over Europe," Time, 15 March 1977, p. 40.
- 9. "In Next Decade--Breakup of Communist World," $\underline{\text{U.S. News and}}$ World Report, 9 August 1976, p. 25.
 - 10. Devlin, p. 15.
- 11. Eusebio M. Mujal-Leon, <u>The Political Objectives of the Communist Party of Spain</u>, p. 17.
- 12. Arrigo Levi, "Italy's 'New' Communism," Foreign Policy, Winter 1976-77, p. 32.
 - 13. Ibid., p. 35.
- 14. Robert J. Lieber, "The Pendulum Swings to Europe," Foreign Policy, Winter 1976-77, p. 45.
 - 15. Ibid., p. 47.
 - 16. Levi, p. 42.

- 17. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 36.
- 18. Gatti, p. 544.
- 19. Lieber, p. 51.
- 20. Levi, p. 39.
- 21. Lieber, p. 48.
- 22. Arrigo Levi, "Euro-Communism and East-West Relations," Survey, Spring/Autumn 1976, p. 92.
 - 23. Gatti, pp. 542-43.
- 24. Neil McInnes, "East-West Relations Within the Communist Movement," <u>Survey</u>, Spring/Autumn 1976, p. 105.

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